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The Politics of Economic Growth
Peter H. Schuck*
The influence of narrow, well-organized groups over political life has
plagued the theory and practice of democracy from the Greek poh/s to
the America of the 1980's. In The Rise and Decline of Nations,I Mancur
Olson, a distinguished economist at the University of Maryland, has im-
aginatively used the analytical tools of economics and political science
to dissect the causes, character and consequences of that influence
today.
The Founding Fathers were schooled in the tumultuous history of
democratic politics in the classical world. In that world, formation of
cabals and cynical manipulation of mobs were common preludes to tyr-
anny; threats to individual liberty and private property were ubiqui-
tous. On the eve of the American Revolution, Adam Smith had warned
that merchants frequently conspired against the public interest, often by
enlisting state power to cement their cartels.2 Madison's apprehension
of "faction" lay at the heart of his design for a large, commercial repub-
lic, as revealed in Federahst #10. 3 In the post-Civil War period, Popu-
lists agitated against political domination by commercial and financial
interests. 4 Early in this century, the Progressives decried the tightening
grip of industrial and political elites over the machinery of government.
This theme also animated much of the early New Deal, when President
Franklin D. Roosevelt thundered against the "economic royalists" on
Wall Street who opposed his measures. Roosevelt's critique reverber-
ated far into the 1960's and 1970's, when reformers like Ralph Nader
and Common Cause denounced the political influence of well-financed
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political action committees, trade associations, single-issue constituen-
cies, and special-interest groups. Even as I write, Presidential candidate
Walter Mondale is being attacked, with apparent effect, for being un-
duly loyal to such groups.
Criticism of the role of influential groups in American politics has
come to dominate academic writing on the subject as well. It was not
always thus. Early work by political scientists of the "pluralist" school,
most notably Arthur Bentley and David Truman, took a decidedly be-
nign view of group action.5 They emphasized the open, unimpeded
processes of group formation, the variety and multiplicity of groups in
politics, and the socially desirable equilibria to which groups' complex
interactions naturally led. To the pluralists, group political activity was
functional, not pathological. It possessed a cybernetic logic, in which
excesses were self-limiting and self-correcting.
The next generation of pluralist political scientists, perhaps best ex-
emplified by Robert Dahl and Edward Banfield, studied group politics
at the more microscopic level of the city.6 Their work, while empirically
richer and normatively more demanding than the Bentley-Truman
genre, reached similarly optimistic conclusions. 7 A relentlessly organiza-
tional politics, they found, was firmly consistent with a coherent concep-
tion of the public interest. This conception was not simply a
tautological or functionalist celebration of whatever policy outcomes the
clash of private interests happened to generate, but a sophisticated, de-
fensible approximation of a democratic ideal.
This happy pluralism, however, proved ephemeral. Indeed, even as
those works were being written, new developments in national politics
and in the academy were subverting their optimistic vision. By the late
1960's, the civil rights struggle, urban riots, the "war on poverty," and
anti-war protest suggested to many that in the group politics game, the
deck was stacked against certain interests.8 A spate of books seeking to
discredit pluralist theory appeared. 9 The most influential of these was
almost certainly Theodore Lowi's The End of Libera/ism. There, Lowi ar-
gued passionately that pluralism had degenerated into a lawless, unac-
countable parody of democratic government. "Interest group
5. A. BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1949); D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMEN-
TAL PROCESS (1951).
6. B. DAHL, WHO GOvERNS? (1961); E. BANFIELD, POLITICAL INFLUENCES (1964).
7. In Dahl's more recent work, however, he has begun to reach more pessimistic
conclusions.
8. The political effectiveness of these efforts, of course, might have implied a somewhat
different view. See, e.g., J. SKOLNICK THE POLITICS OF PROTEST (1969).
9. See, e.g., G. MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1966); H.
KARIEL, THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN PLURALISM (1961).
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liberalism", as Lowi called it, had been forged into an effective instru-
ment of exploitation by which narrow interest groups had managed to
seize the structures of discretionary, bureaucratic power.10 They used
this power self-consciously and self-interestedly to extract regressive sub-
sidies, destroy competition, and consolidate their influence over a su-
pine, complaisant administrative apparatus.
More than a decade before Lowi's book appeared, economists had
also begun to criticize the pluralist vision of politics, but from another
direction. In a seminal book published in 1957, Anthony Downs ap-
plied the rationality assumptions of microeconomic theory to the polit-
ical behavior of individual voters and elected officials.1 ' Downs later
extended that analysis to the behavior of appointed bureaucrats. 12
Other economists, employing similar theoretical premises, developed op-
timizing models of regulatory, legislative, and even judicial action.' 3
These models invariably predicted that well-organized groups would ex-
ert a disproportionate influence over official decisions, leading to ineffi-
cient, inequitable public policies. To these analysts, political decision
processes were easily captured and readily distorted. Political alloca-
tions, they maintained, were almost always inferior to those of the
market.
Perhaps the most interesting and fruitful effort to build upon this eco-
nomic approach to politics was Mancur Olson's book, The Logic of Collec-
tive Action, published in 1965. There, Olson was primarily concerned
with internal organizational behavior, not political behavior,' 4 but he
sought to account for an apparent paradox in organizational life that
was of great political significance. The paradox is that although many
individuals may have some interest in common, and although they may
recognize and wish to act upon it, they will not-if they are rational-act
in their common interest. Each individual, knowing where her self-in-
terest lies and also knowing that her fellows' self-interests correspond to
hers, will nevertheless fail to organize to achieve those common interests.
Indeed, each will behave in this way despite the fact, presumably appar-
10. T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC
AUTHORITY (1969).
11. A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).
12. A. DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1967).
13. See, e.g., G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY (1968); W. RIKER, THE
THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS (1962).
14. M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). [hereinafter referred to as
LOGIC]. The term "internal" is perhaps infelicitous in this context. Olson, like most modern
organization theorists, views the organization not as a self-contained, discrete entity but as a
looser structure of linkages and interactions between individuals, resources and goals.
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ent to all, that each knows that this failure to act collectively may elimi-
nate any hope of achieving the common goal.
Olson derived an explanation for this paradox from the economic the-
ory of public goods. A public good is one that, once supplied to any
individual, cannot feasibly be withheld from others. Once a public good
is produced, the marginal cost of supplying an additional unit of it is
usually very low (often zero) but the marginal cost of withholding it
from others would be extremely high. Clean air, national defense, and
law are common examples. Because public goods cannot be individu-
ally appropriated, voluntary market choices cannot assure their supply.
Without some form of coercion or coordination, rational individuals will
not contribute to the production of a public good. By waiting for others
to contribute, each can hope to enjoy its benefits without sharing in the
costs necessary to produce it. Moreover, each will recognize that her
own contribution would neither significantly increase the probability
that the good would be produced nor significantly affect the similar cal-
culations of other rational individuals. Public goods, in short, fall victim
to a massive "free rider" effect.
The important insight in The Logzc of Collective Action was that most
organizations are public goods in this fundamental sense. Accordingly,
Olson's rational individual will neither join nor support organizations in
the absence of some technique that can overcome the free rider effect.
But since organizations in fact abound, how could Olson account for
their existence? The answer lies in the notion of "selective incentives"-
that is, incentives that an organization can extend to or withhold from
individuals depending upon whether or not they contribute to the or-
ganization's support. 15 An organization's selective incentives may take
many forms: legally-sanctioned coercion, such as a labor union's closed
shop agreement; the threat of extra-legal sanctions against those who fail
to join; or positive inducements, such as charter flights, group insurance,
or patronage restricted to members. The social status or opportunity to
rub shoulders that membership in a prestigious organization provides
may also constitute an important selective incentive; if membership cre-
ates feelings of intense solidarity, that too may suffice to induce individ-
uals' support.16 Finally, if the organization is sufficiently small that an
individual member can expect to appropriate a share of the organiza-
tional product that exceeds the costs to her of helping to produce it, she
15. It should be noted that this idea was not original to Olson, but had been developed
earlier by a number of organization theorists, notably Chester Barnard, in THE FUNCTIONS
OF THE EXECUTIVE (1938) and Wilson & Clark, Incentive Systems. A Theory of Organiration, VI
ADMIN. Sci. QTRLY 129 (1961); J.Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS (1973).




will also have an incentive to join. I7
For most organizations, however, and especially for large ones, Ol-
son's paradox remains. Selective inducements sufficient to eliminate the
free rider effect are often unavailable to them. Moreover, information
about organizations is itself a public good, thus reinforcing the paradox.
Such information is usually inadequate in amount, especially when it
relates to complex political issues, and the rational citizen may have no
incentive to inform herself about organizations and public affairs. This
civic ignorance renders the formation and maintenance of large organi-
zations designed to influence public policy even more problematic.
I have paused to describe the theory developed in Olson's earlier book
because that theory constitutes the intellectual core of The Rise and De-
cline of Nations. In this review essay, I shall discuss the latter work in
three sections. The first summarizes the main points of Olson's book;
the second criticizes its theory in a number of respects; and the third
explores some of the theory's implications for law and public policy.
I
The structure of The Rise and Decline of Nations is straightforward. Af-
ter summarizing the theory of collective action developed in his earlier
book, Olson derives implications from it in the form of nine proposi-
tions. 1  Some propositions are causal statements that assert the exist-
17. The amount of the organizational, product, however, apparently will be sub-optimal.
See Appendix, LOGIC at 171.
18. The propositions are as follows:
1. There will be no countries that attain symmetrical organization of all groups with a
common interest and thereby attain optimal outcomes through comprehensive
bargaining.
2. Stable societies with unchanged boundaries tend to accumulate more collusions and
organizations for collective action over time.
3. Members of "small" groups have disproportionate organizational power for collec-
tive action, and this disproportion diminishes but does not disappear over time in stable
societies.
4. On balance, special-interest organizations and collusions reduce efficiency and ag-
gregate income in the societies in which they operate and make political life more
divisive.
5. Encompassing organizations have some incentive to make the society in which they
operate more prosperous, and an incentive to redistribute income to their members with
as little excess burden as possible, and to cease such redistribution unless the amount
redistributed is substantial in relation to the social cost of the redistribution.
6. Distributional coalitions make decisions more slowly than the individuals and firms
of which they are comprised, tend to have crowded agendas and bargaining tables, and
more often fix prices than quantities.
7. Distributional coalitions slow down a society's capacity to adopt new technologies
and to reallocate resources in response to changing conditions, and thereby reduce the
rate of economic growth.
8. Distributional coalitions, once big enough to succeed, are exclusive, and seek to limit
the diversity of incomes and values of their membership.
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ence of relationships between one or more social, organizational and
economic variables. Implication # 7, for example, holds that "Distribu-
tional coalitions 19 slow down a society's capacity to adopt new technolo-
gies and to reallocate resources in response to changing conditions, and
thereby reduce the rate of economic growth." Others simply describe a
set of non-causal relationships between variables; for example, implica-
tion #8 holds that "Distributional coalitions, once big enough to suc-
ceed, are exclusive, and seek to limit the diversity of incomes and values
of their membership." Most of the implications are quite plausible on
their face, but only one seems self-evidently true (# 1). Another-that
"members of small groups have disproportionate organizational power
for collective action"-struck this reader as controversial, if not counter-
intuitive. 20
The nine implications, taken together, comprise the essential theory of
the book. Because it (as Olson proudly notes) is "certainly a simple"
theory,2 1 its main tenets (always subject, of course, to the condition that
other things remain equal) can be briefly stated. Small, homogeneous
distributional coalitions, Olson argues, are inimical to economic growth.
These coalitions tend to advocate policies that will enable their mem-
bers to obtain a larger share of the existing social product rather than
support policies that will increase the quantity of that product. They
therefore support policies that are socially inefficient, such as protective
tariffs, rent control laws, and crop price supports so long as they can
hope to appropriate a disproportionate share of the benefits for their
members while externalizing the costs of those inefficient policies to non-
members. But these coalitions will not support socially efficient policies
if (as is usually the case) the costs they must incur to achieve those effi-
ciencies exceed the benefits they can appropriate for their members.
Larger organizations, in contrast, have a greater stake in more efficient
policies. Because their membership constitutes a significant proportion
9. The accumulation of distributional coalitions increases the complexity of regulation,
the role of government, and the complexity of understandings, and changes the direction
of social evolution.
NATIONS at 74.
19. This is Olson's term for special interest groups. He defines it to include those organi-
zations that seek to increase the distribution of income and wealth enjoyed by their members.
NATIONS at 44.
20. Although Olson's theory implies that small groups possess certain distinct political
advantages that larger groups do not, it is also true that larger groups, especially if well dis-
tributed geographically, may translate their greater numbers into political influence. Cohe-
siveness and numerosity may often be inversely related, but that does not mean that each is
not independently a valuable resource in democratic politics, especially in a legislature. For a
similar point, see R. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGT. ScI. 335-
58 (1974).
21. NATIONs at 235.
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of the entire population, such organizations2 2 can capture a large share
of the efficiency benefits, and that share may well exceed the costs to
them of producing the more efficient policy.23
Olson also relates organizational behavior-and, ultimately, eco-
nomic efficiency-to freedom of resource movement. He reasons that a
stable society, and one that restricts the geographic and economic scope
of the market in which its members buy and sell, will engender and
sustain more distributional coalitions over time than a less stable one or
one with open economic borders. Distributional coalitions, Olson main-
tains, also increase the role of government, the complexity of regula-
tions, and the elaborateness of customs and understandings. 24 Most
important, they reduce the society's economic growth rate because of
their indifference to efficiency and their preoccupation with wealth
redistribution.
Olson offers several corollaries as well. Although stable environments
nurture distributional coalitions that retard economic growth, he con-
tends, instability may equally impede growth; thus, upheavals in which
the prospects for long-term stability are favorable are the situations most
conducive to growth. Even more important for understanding the polit-
ical dynamics of welfare state liberalism is his notion that the alleviation
of poverty is itself a public good, subject to the same paradoxical organi-
zational logic applicable to other public goods. Individual productive
capacities, Olson suggests, are distributed more equally in the popula-
tion than is the capacity to organize effective distributional coalitions.
For this reason, progressive redistributional initiatives by government
will often go awry, subverted by the power of existing, more effective
coalitions. Finally, and importantly, Olson notes that the ability of a
laissez-faire policy to promote economic growth is a variable, not a con-
stant; its value simply cannot be accurately appraised apart from the
organizational context in which it operates.
Having laid out his theory, Olson devotes the bulk of the book to
testing it against a dazzling, extraordinarily eclectic array of empirical
evidence. His theory purports to explain patterns of economic growth
among different regions in the United States, among the so-called "gang
of four" (Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore), and in Germany,
Japan, Britain, Holland, and France. Olson also applies it to explain
the nature of the British class structure, the Indian caste system, the
22. These "encompassing" organizations, as Olson calls them, create some difficulty for
his theory. See infra at 369 et. seq.
23. NATIONS at 47-48.
24. One suspects that by this last phrase, Olson means to refer to the opacity or inaccessi-
bility of social meanings and communications.
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evolution of apartheid in South Africa, urban decay, governance pat-
terns in the Third World, stagflation, business cycles, sticky wages and
prices, and unemployment.2 5
Before evaluating Olson's claim, I should mention two remarkable
features of his argument. One is related to expository style, the other to
methodology. Through painstaking effort, Olson has managed to elabo-
rate and defend a sophisticated theory of national economic growth
without once resorting to professional jargon, mathematical formulae or
other technical apparatus. His intended audience, to all appearances, is
the serious reader without any special technical training, and that
reader will find the argument perfectly accessible. 26 The clarity and
simplicity of Olson's presentation are singular achievements in so intel-
lectually ambitious a book.
Even more striking is Olson's scrupulous, even fastidious, attention to
methodology and to the accurate statement and restatement of his
claims. He frequently reminds the reader that his theory is incomplete,
that the kind of theory that he has developed cannot be verified experi-
mentally or rigorously, and that this strengthens the theorist's obligation
to avoid grandiose, insupportable scientific claims. For one who believes
that he has grasped an important truth, he is as candid about the limita-
tions of his approach as can reasonably be expected. He clearly articu-
lates what he means by a good theory, what constitutes probative
evidence, and how his hypotheses might be refuted. He distinguishes
between weak and strong supporting evidence and calls the reader's at-
tention to data that cast some doubt upon his conclusions. Again and
again, he reminds us that his theory is not offered as a monocausal ex-
planation of differential economic growth rates but is intended only to
emphasize one important and neglected factor contributing to those
differences.
Punctiliously respectful of the analysts upon whose work he has
drawn, Olson is also extremely charitable to others, like the monetarists
and equilibrium theorists, whose approaches he considers but ultimately
rejects. His macroeconomic policy prescriptions are modest and (with
one exception) 27 non-controversial; Olson assures us, however, that this
circumspection has less to do with the putative policy relevance of his
theory than with his intention to address such questions at length in
another book.28 In short, The Rise and Decline of Nati'ons combines auda-
25. Although Olson's theory does not explain the National League's persistent domina-
tion of the All-Star game, one suspects that the omission is simply an oversight.
26. For the initiated, Olson provides a technical bibliography and explanatory notes.
27. The exception is his proposal for a tax-based income policy, see NATIONS at 234.




cious, imaginative yet parsimonious theory-building with a deep intel-
lectual integrity. If it accomplished no more than that, it would
constitute an impressive piece of work.
In fact, The Rzse and Decline of Nations accomplishes a great deal more.
It tackles a problem of awesome complexity and profound signifi-
cance-the economic performance of democratic societies in the recent
past and in the future. In an admirable but all too rare example of
professional self-criticism, it deploys careful economic analysis to ap-
praise the disappointing efforts by economists to explain this phenome-
non. It isolates an important ingredient of the problem and illuminates
it by resourcefully integrating theory and evidence. And it advances
hypotheses that will surely facilitate and stimulate both criticism of Ol-
son's own work and efforts by others to extend and refine it.
II
Ambitious, broad-ranging theories about large social phenomena in-
evitably invite disappointment and disagreement. Creative, useful the-
ory-building in social science demands radical simplification; realities
must be stripped of their complexity. Finding the appropriate level of
factual detail is one of the theorist's most difficult challenges. It is al-
most always possible to say of such theories, therefore, that they over-
generalize, overlooking important contextual details that render their
hypotheses contingently, rather than universally, true. Olson's theory is
no exception. For all of its valuable insights and creative use of evi-
dence, it presents many difficulties of this kind. Some of these may
prove tractable to subsequent refinement, but many, I strongly suspect,
inhere in the limited power of social science methods when applied to
phenomena as stupefyingly diverse and complex as national economies.
In saying this, however, I do not in any way mean to dim the lustre of
Olson's effort and achievement. On the contrary, the skill with which
he has pressed against and even expanded those methodological and in-
tellectual limits deserves enthusiastic praise. The Rise and Dechne of Na-
tions represents social science theory-building at its very best.
A critique of Olson's theory might well begin by noting the weakness
and ambiguity with which he specifies its principal variables. The idea
of a "distributional coalition," the conceptual centerpiece of Olson's
schema and the subject of no less than four pages of definitional discus-
sion, 29 raises some troublesome questions at the outset. For Olson, the
defining characteristic of such an organization is a purpose to redistrib-
29. Id. at 43-47.
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ute "income and wealth" rather than to increase efficiency and out-
put.30 One wonders whether environmental, civil liberties, and other
"public interest" groups would qualify under this definition. Their ac-
tivities, after all, significantly affect the distribution of income and
wealth; indeed, they may affect economic growth in precisely the ways
that most concern Olson. Nevertheless, that is not their essential goal-
unless, of course, income and wealth are defined tautologically to in-
clude anything that anyone values. This particular ambiguity actually
reflects a larger problem with Olson's theory, one that afflicted The Logic
of Collective Action as well. I refer to its inability to explain widespread
voluntary support for large "public interest" groups, such as the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union and the Moral Majority, that do not dis-
tribute significant selective incentives.
Olson does not ignore this problem but neither does he give it the
attention that it deserves. He seeks to resolve it (in a textual footnote)
by acknowledging the existence of altruistic motives for organizational
support. Olson distinguishes between "rational" and "participatory"
(or "Kantian") altruists. The first type includes individuals whose pref-
erences take account of the effect of the organization's collective goals on
the welfare of others. Like rational non-altruists, he maintains, they will
not contribute to organizations, for they too will yield to the free rider
effect. Participatory altruists, however, are a different breed. According
to Olson, they derive personal benefit "not from observably better out-
comes for others, but rather from [their] own sacrifices for them. '31
Such a motive does not implicate the free rider effect and actually de-
mands personal contribution to the organization for its satisfaction.
Thus, contributions from participatory altruists will be forthcoming, Ol-
son concedes, "even in the largest groups."
This concession naturally leads one to ask two further questions: how
common is participatory altruism, and how much organizational behav-
ior can be explained by it? Olson's response to these questions-that
this "is presumably not the usual form of altruism"-is decidedly inade-
quate. It is especially so if one speculates that much participatory altru-
ism is animated not by the pleasures of self-sacrifice that Olson mentions
but by the somewhat differen pleasures of participation in a large, col-
lective effort. Common obseration of organizational life, as well as the
intuitions of classical political theorists, suggest that the impulse to par-
ticipate in civic affairs is an important element of what it means to be a
human, social being. Participation is an intrinsic, not merely an instru-
30. Id. at 44.




mental, value, especially in a liberal society in which voluntarism helps
to legitimate activity. And although we do not, and probably cannot,
know what proportions of altruistic behavior are "rational" (that is,
purely other-regarding), participatory and self-sacrificing, much less
what proportion of organizational behavior can be explained by each,
one can say with some confidence that participation is a very common
motive in American organizations.
Olson's exclusive preoccupation with rationality (even as enlarged to
include "rational altruism") reveals both a strength and a weakness of
economics as a professional discipline. The rationality assumption
makes it possible for Olson to construct a theory that appears to be rig-
orous and testable. This move, however, demands that the theory rele-
gate non-rational motives to the margins and interstices of
organizational life. It also demands that we imagine, however implausi-
ble it may be, that the same kind of motivation fuels organizations as
disparate as Common Cause, the Iron and Steel Institute, the Republi-
can Party, and the World Council of Churches. 32
If Olson's notion of "distributional coalition" rests upon questionable
motivational assumptions, other key concepts are problematic in other
respects. "Stability" and "encompassing organizations," for example,
play important roles in the theory, yet definitions-even tentative,
working definitions-are neither provided nor self-evident. In discuss-
ing how stability affects economic growth in less developed countries,
Olson apparently has in mind some notion of political consensus and
continuity.33 Elsewhere, however, he uses it to suggest a set of more
general conditions conducive to organizational development, without
ever specifying what those conditions might be. 34 The difference in
these meanings may be significant when it comes to testing his theory
empirically. The period of the 1960's, for example, was manifestly a
period of political instability in the United States, yet it was also a seed-
time for distributional coalitions such as community action organiza-
tions, welfare rights groups, and environmental and consumer
associations.
The idea of "encompassing organizations," so central to the theory, is
also vague. Although Olson emphasizes the different, more socially re-
sponsive incentives that such organizations face by reason of their broad
32. Olson's main interest, of course, is in organizations that influence national economic
growth. Significantly, however, the scope of his organizational theory is not so limited, nor
does he suggest how such a limitation could be defined and applied empirically.
33. NATIONS at 165.
34. Id. at 40.
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membership, 35 he provides no criterion (other than "membership consti-
tuting a substantial portion of the societ[y]") 36 that might enable us to
know an encompassing organization when we see one. The problem is
not that Olson fails to furnish neat, well-defined categories; the subject
simply does not admit of that. Rather, the problem is that the category
itself turns out to be amorphous. Because organizational size is a very
important variable in his theory-the idea of encompassing organiza-
tions is the basis for one of its major implications (#5)-this is a crucial
defect. Thus, Olson, after citing the efficiency-seeking incentives of en-
compassing organizations, concedes that they may also possess more mo-
nopoly power, which of course is the power to impose social
inefficiencies. 3 7 He goes on to observe that such organizations are often
paralyzed by internal conflicts of interest and therefore are unable "to
have any great influence on public policy, or even coherent and specific
policies."'38 My point is not that all organizations and political struc-
tures are equally capable of taking the broad view. 39 It is that Olson's
theory is internally inconsistent in important respects and cannot pre-
dict the circumstances under which organizations will behave in the effi-
ciency-enhancing way that he describes and wishes to encourage.
A second set of difficulties, related to the first, once again involves
Olson's crucial independent variable, the distributional coalition. The
problem here is his failure to clarify the precise aspect of such coalitions
upon which the theory relies. Is it the formation of coalitions? Their actv-
thes, once formed? Or the consequences of those activities? If it is the
latter, as I suspect, then the theory fails because it tells us little about
what those consequences will be, or even about their general character
or tendency. Suppose, for example, that the theory predicts (as it does)
that a small, relatively homogeneous group of auto manufacturers will
organize to seek tariff protection from low-cost imports. Can the theory
help us to predict the circumstances under which that effort will in fact
be successful? Is it not possible, perhaps even probable, that such a
distributional coalition will precipitate at least an equal and opposite
counterforce in the form of organizing efforts by importers of foreign-
made autos and by exporters and others with a stake in free trade,
thereby neutralizing the domestic automakers? Empirical study and
casual observation both suggest that this political dialectic often oc-
35. See supra at 365.
36. NATIONS at 47.
37. Id. at 49.
38. Id. at 50.
39. On the contrary, I have argued elsewhere in favor of constitutional reforms that
would tend to redress the existing imbalance in favor of localistic politics. See Schuck, "Indus-




curs. 40 Olson might respond that the resulting political synthesis-the
ultimate policy comprise-might still be more inefficient than if such dis-
tributional coalitions could not organize effective political power. But if
the theory is indeterminate on this point, if it cannot tell us when or
even whether such a response will occur (and it is difficult to see how it
can), then how useful are Olson's propositions about the organizational
determinants of economic growth?
The theory also does not take adequate account of either the conflicts
of interest within distributional coalitions, or of the divergence between
the goals of an organization's leaders and the rank-and-file. Although
Olson does recognize the existence of intra-organizational conflicts, 4 1 he
fails to explore the implications of this ubiquitous phenomenon for the
hypothesized relationship between coalitions and economic growth.
This omission is especially striking because such conflicts are most likely
to occur within precisely those organizations-the ones that Olson de-
scribes as "encompassing"-that the theory predicts are most likely to
pursue socially efficient policies. 42 By the same token, the theory as-
sumes (contrary to much evidence) that one can predict an organiza-
tion's actions by knowing (or supposing that one knows) the (putatively
monolithic) interests of its individual members.
In the short run, at least, Olson's own theory would lead one instead
to expect the opposite. Precisely because organizations pursue public
goods and because information about intra-organizational activities and
politics (as well as about the external public goods that they seek) is a
public good, organizational leaders should be expected to behave rather
differently than their individual members. The former, after all, receive
special selecti've incenti'ves (that is, benefits that can be granted to some and
withheld from others) merely by virtue of their organizational status
and privileges, while the latter face incentives of quite another sort. It is
commonplace, for example, that leaders of labor unions and other orga-
nizations are often more disposed to negotiate and compromise with
competing organizations than are their less conciliatory rank-and-file.
40. See R. BAUER, I. POOL & L. DEXTER, AMERICAN BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY:
THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN TRADE (1963) for a careful study of the politics of foreign trade
policy. The controversy over the so-called "domestic content" legislation is a current exam-
ple. The House has passed H.R. 1234, a proposed Fair Practices and Procedures in Automo-
tive Products Act of 1983. The bill requires that Motor Vehicles for Sale in the United States
contain a specified level of parts manufactured in the United States. 98th Cong., 2nd Session.
41. NATIONS at 91.
42. Olson also seems to presume that an organization that possesses an incentive to seek
efficient policies will be able to discern clearly what those policies are. This is a highly dubi-
ous presumption, especially when organizations are not profit-seeking enterprises, which is
commonly the case with lobbying groups, or when market imperfections provide distorted
signals even to for-profit firms.
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The truth of the matter is that the celer'sparbus condition-the funda-
mental assumption that gives Olson's theory its apparent explanatory
power-seldom if ever obtains in the real world. In fact, it conceals
numerous sources of variation in organizational behavior and effective-
ness and in the relationship of these variables to economic growth. In
the realm of broad-gauged social theory, of course, it could hardly be
otherwise. Unfortunately, the fact that Olson repeatedly concedes this
difficulty does not diminish its weight in appraising the power of his
theory.
A third class of problems has to do with Olson's data and the possibil-
ity of alternative explanations for differential growth rates. It is difficult
for this reviewer, as a non-specialist, to evaluate the unusually diverse
melange of evidence that Olson has adduced to test and confirm his
hypotheses. Precisely because many of these data are technical, histori-
cal and often somewhat impressionistic, however, I suspect that the spe-
cialist will often be uneasy with the way in which Olson uses them.
Even as a "lay" reader, I was troubled by at least one statistical assump-
tion-that a region's stability and consequent rate of organizational for-
mation will affect its rate of economic growth, but that the causality will
not run the other way.4 3 This assumption strikes me as implausible, for
there is reason to believe that rapid economic growth will indeed stimu-
late organizational growth and activity. In part, this is because organi-
zational participation is highly correlated with individual income and
that correlation probably obtains at the national level as well. In part,
it is because economic growth tends to create conditions, such as urban-
ization, environmental pollution, and social change, that citizens fre-
quently seek to control or influence through collective activity. In
addition, Robert Crandall's 4 4 analysis of the strategic use of Clean Air
Act regulation to influence inter-regional economic competition suggests
that differential growth rates may sometimes encourage distributional
coalitions to form, coalitions that may in turn affect the distribution of
economic growth among regions.
Olson readily acknowledges that it is usually possible to propose alter-
native accounts of the phenomena that a theory such as his purports to
explain, and he proceeds to consider a number of them. The most obvi-
ous alternative candidate is the "catch-up hypothesis"-the notion that
much or all of the differential in growth rates may be due to the differ-
43. NATIONS at 98.
44. R. CRANDALL, CONTROLLING INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION: THE ECONOMICS AND POLI-




ence in the original base levels from which growth is measured. 45 Olson
concedes that this hypothesis is also consistent with most of the data.
Yet instead of concluding that this concession could diminish the attrac-
tiveness of his own, far less parsimonious theory, he simply observes that
the two theories are "compatible". Unless I am mistaken, however,
these alternative explanations, far from being compatible, are in fact
direct competitors; that is, to the extent that the catch-up hypothesis
accounts for the observed differences in growth rates, Olson's theory is
unnecessary.
Other alternative explanations also may readily be imagined. For
example, regions and nations are endowed quite differently with
human, physical or other economically-relevant resources. From this
perspective, observed growth patterns and differentials may reflect the
changing economic relevance over time of certain types of natural en-
dowments and investments in human capital, rather than reflecting or-
ganizational strategies. Thus, if Japan's growth rate now exceeds that of
many resource-rich countries such as the United States or Canada, it
may be because Japan has invested more heavily in the kind of educa-
tional system that generates high pay-offs in a post-industrial society.
Perhaps Olson would respond that this educational strategy is really
only a spurious explanation of growth rates-that is, it is only possible
because Japanese organizations are fewer and more encompassing than
American ones and therefore encourage such educational policies. In
the absence of evidence, however, such a response seems unconvincing.
III
Olson's theory, as he emphasizes, is built upon the paradoxical logic
of collective action, a logic that impels organizations to seek narrowly
appropriable, socially inefficient benefits for their members in order to
overcome the public goods feature of most public policies. But the the-
ory also suggests another, and in some ways more far-reaching, paradox
that Olson does not develop. It is the idea that the remarkable success
of liberal democracy in America is self-destructive, bearing the sources
of its own demise.
Traditional liberalism located ultimate political and moral values in
the individual citizen; the ends of the state were nothing more than an
aggregate of these individual ends. Liberal constitutionalism was pri-
marily a quest for legal institutions capable of protecting the processes
by which individuals formed and acted upon those purposes. A core
45. NATIONs at 114.
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constitutional value, then, was the individual's freedom to pursue her
self-interest in voluntary cooperation with others. This value implied
the related rights of contract and of associational activity.
Associational freedom was especially precious for several reasons.
First, it was essential to the creation and maintenance of institutions
that could stand between the individual and the state. These mediating
institutions, including the family, religious organizations, civic associa-
tions, labor unions, and the like, could enlarge individuals' stature and
capacities for self-realization, while also limiting the potentially perni-
cious powers of government. Second, the fundamental structures and
arrangements in a liberal political and economic order were established
largely through a process of group conflict and negotiation. Indeed, as-
sociational freedom was prior to contractual freedom, for freedom of
contract was one of the social institutions whose very scope and meaning
were determined by group-dominated political activity. This was par-
ticularly true in those domains of social life-most notably the produc-
tion of externalities, the pursuit of public goods, and the creation of non-
market values-in which even legally-protected contractual activity
could not be counted upon to yield optimal social outcomes. Thus, asso-
ciational freedom promised to help resolve some of liberalism's most
profound internal dilemmas-the atomizing, deracinating, alienating
tendencies of radical individualism,46 and the need to translate individ-
ual preferences into credible, legitimate political outcomes. 47 It is no
wonder, then, that Courts interpreting the Constitution have sedulously
protected associational freedom 48 in the latter's many manifestations,
and that the United States has attained the highest level of voluntary
organizational activity in the world. 49
The menacing paradox that Olson's theory reveals is not simply that
this happy marriage of associational freedom and liberal politics is on
the rocks, but that the marriage's past triumphs may well have made the
current, growing breach irreconcilable. This notion reminds one of Jo-
seph Schumpeter's argument in his classic of four decades ago, Capital-
46. See, e.g., Thomas Hobbes' chilling description of the "masterless man" freed from con-
ventional restraints, LEVIATHAN (1651); and Emile Durkheim's account of "anomie" in lib-
eral society, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 353-373 (1933).
47. By this, I mean the operational problem of a political system in communicating
among members, leaders and institutions, not the logical problem of establishing and imple-
menting a "social welfare function" consistent with individual preferences.
48. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 4156 (1963); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
49. G. ALMOND & S. VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE: POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND DE-
MOCRACY IN FIVE NATIONS (1963); G. ALMOND & S. VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE REVIS-




ism, Socialism and Democracy.50 There, Schumpeter predicted that the
same material prosperity that had been capitalism's greatest gift to lib-
eral democracy would erode and ultimately destroy the moral and social
values upon which capitalism rested, leading to its eventual downfall as
an economic and ideological system. By a similar kind of perverse social
logic, it would seem that one of liberal democracy's great political inno-
vations-the constitutionally-protected and legally-encouraged freedom
to form purposive organizations-may threaten to undermine the polit-
ical creativity of that order, sapping its ability to respond flexibly and
effectively to new challenges and circumstances. Even more ominous,
this logic suggests that the processes of social sclerosis and political ossifi-
cation that "special interest" group politics engender may well be cumu-
lative, self-reinforcing and perhaps even irreversible.
I hasten to add that Olson neither carries his analysis this far nor
makes this dire prediction. It is a conclusion, however, to which his own
logic seems inexorably to lead. It is unfortunate, therefore, that Olson
devotes only a single page, the last of his book, to this extremely troub-
ling and profoundly important question, and that his summary treat-
ment of it is so unsatisfying. After noting that the political activity of
distributional coalitions is not the only factor that determines economic
growth, he observes that ideas are sometimes decisive. In particular, Ol-
son suggests, the melancholy implications of his own theory might, if
communicated to and believed by enough people, generate "irresistible
political support for policies to solve the problem that this book ex-
plains. '51 In that event, which Olson concedes is "extraordinarily un-
likely", the society might manage to avert the impending disaster.
Olson's own theory, unfortunately, gives us scant reason to believe
that such a rescue would in fact occur. As he admits, the special inter-
ests would organize to prevent the repeal of legislation that confers their
narrow benefits; 52 moreover (as he fails to point out), efforts to inform
and persuade citizens that the system is failing are themselves public
goods that the market will under-supply, thereby augmenting the al-
ready great political advantages of the existing distributional coalitions.
To these brute facts and grim logic, Olson's wistful parting rejoinder-
affirming the power of ideas and hoping that a "wider awareness will
greatly limit the losses from special interests"-seems like so much
whistling past the graveyard. 53
A more meaningful response to this dilemma-one fully consistent
50. J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1942).
51. NATIONS at 236.
52. Id. at 236-237.
53. Characteristically, Olson is aware of and does not seek to conceal the weakness of this
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with Olson's theory-might be that at some point in the slide toward
national economic decay, the costs of inefficiency would become so great
that they would begin to enter the individual calculations of the self-
interested distributional coalitions themselves. To put the point another
way, the social inefficiencies of special-interest advantages may so re-
duce the size of the entire pie as to impair the ability of individual coali-
tions to obtain their customary slices by externalizing those
inefficiencies. In that event, rational self-interest might prompt even a
large but non-encompassing coalition to relinquish some of its power in
order to obtain for its members their appropriable shares of the resulting
increased social efficiencies, thereby improving their net positions. On a
smaller scale, the recent "give-ups" agreed to by certain powerful labor
unions are vivid manifestations of this possibility. Again, however, the
likelihood and adequacy of this kind of response would be limited by the
perverse effects of "free rider" incentives, which would encourage each
coalition to resist such sacrifices in the hope that sacrifices by other co-
alitions would render its own unnecessary.
If associational freedom has paradoxically created political conditions
that threaten America's economic and political viability, and if these
conditions are unlikely to be self-correcting (except, perhaps, in the long
run when, as Keynes remarked, we are all dead), what are we to do?
Olson cannot help us here, for he eschews (at least until his next book)
any policy implications beyond those of a purely economic sort. 54 If his
theory and my analysis of it are correct, however, the problem is far
more basic and systemic, transcending the boundaries of economic pol-
icy and going instead to the very foundations of our constitutional and
political structures. If this is indeed our situation, then a more thor-
oughgoing set of responses to the problem of institutional inertia and
political paralysis must be considered. A book review is hardly the place
to canvass the possibilities, much less evaluate them. Nevertheless, a
very brief discussion of a number of different avenues to reform (some of
which I personally would not endorse) may be an appropriate way to
conclude this essay.
One approach would attempt to discourage the initial formation of
distributional coalitions and restrict particular organizational activities
that significantly shape the political process and through it, the nature
of our economic system. For example, statutory impediments might be
created, or judicially-developed antitrust principles applied, to limit the
position. His final sentence is: "That is what I expect, at least when I am searching for a
happy ending." Id.
54. NATIONS at 232-234.
Vol. 2:359, 1984
Review Essay
opportunity of potential competitors to collude in economic and polit-
ical life. These techniques, however, are severely constrained by First
Amendment norms protecting the right to form groups55 and the right
to use the legislative, administrative, and judicial processes to advance
groups' political-economic agendas. 56 They also protect, within limits,
the ability of interest groups to influence the political process through
campaign contributions or publicity. 57 Furthermore, even valid limita-
tions of this kind of activity are as a practical matter extremely difficult
to enforce effectively. In short, the elevated constitutional status of asso-
ciational freedom would make significant inhibition of organizational
activity unlikely, even if that approach were thought to be wise and
politically feasible.
A second approach, one that Olson's theory explicitly supports, would
be to pursue a systematic strategy of what he calls "jurisdictional inte-
gration". The basic notion, borrowed from Adam Smith and James
Madison, is that enlarging the domain within which economic and
political interests must compete reduces the amount of influence that
any small number of interests can exert. 58 "Extend the sphere,"
Madison wrote in The Federa/ist, No. 10, "and you take in a greater vari-
ety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of
the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citi-
zens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all
who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each
other." 59
One difficulty with this "jurisdictional integration" strategy, of
course, is that by altering the scope of conflicts and opportunity, it en-
genders strong, often irresistible, political opposition. Free trade is thus
thwarted by strong protectionist thrusts by labor unions and corpora-
tions. Free immigration is opposed by unions and certain other interests
that can appeal to nationalistic impulses as well as self-interest. Trans-
55. See supra p. 373 el. seq.
56. E.g., Eastern Rail. Pres. Conf. V. Noerr Motor Frgt., Inc. 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United
Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
57. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765 (1978).
58. Smith stressed the value of a free trade system:
According to this liberal and generous system, therefore, the most advantageous
method in which a landed nation can raise up artificers, manufacturers, and merchants
of its own, is to grant the most perfect freedom of trade to the artificers, manufacturers
and merchants of all other nations. It thereby raises the value of the surplus produce of
its own land, of which the continual increase gradually establishes a fund, which in due
time necessarily raises up all the artificers, manufacturers and merchants whom it has
occasion for.
SMITH, supra note 3 at 192.
59. See supra note 2 at 61.
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national political cooperation is hobbled by forces of a similar charac-
ter.60 The power of these coalitions does ebb and flow over time and
there has been a pronounced long-term trend against protectionism.
Nevertheless, opposition to integration is likely to remain formidable in
any conceivable future. Another difficulty with such a strategy, at least
insofar as jurisdictional integration requires more centralized adminis-
tration of activity, is that it may place greater responsibilities upon gov-
ernance and coordinating structures than centralized organs can
effectively discharge.
A third approach would seek to shift the allocation of decisional initi-
ative and power within existing jurisdictions rather than redesigning the
jurisdictions or organizations themselves. It would attempt to narrow,
rather than expand, the domain in which key decisions are made,
thereby altering the power stakes, resources, and patterns of decision.
Its essential idea is that if special interests dominate certain political
structures, it might be possible to attenuate their power somewhat by
remitting decisions to other processes in which those interests play a less
commanding role. Deregulation of previously regulated markets, such
as air travel and financial institutions, is one manifestation of this idea.
Another is administrative decentralization of certain governmental
functions, such as the operation of public school systems, to local com-
munity boards. Yet another is the ideal of economic democracy, in
which workers would be given greater personal and group stakes in the
productivity and performance of their employers, sharing power that
has traditionally been reserved to management. 6 1
The problems with these strategies center not only on the persistence
of political and administrative obstacles to implementing them, but also
on the sheer intellectual difficulty of specifying the circumstances under
which they are likely to be successful. Occasionally, however, good the-
ory may combine with empirical support and political skill to produce a
basic change in the location of decisional initiative that Olson's theory
concerning organizational resistance to reform would not have pre-
dicted. The dismantling of the Bell System and the deregulation of tele-
communications are important reminders that this is not a utopian
suggestion.
A fourth approach would emphasize appeals to the common interests
60. The recent difficulties of the United Nations and the Common Market in sustaining
their current levels of economic and political integration is a dramatic example of the latter.
61. Robert Reich is a prominent advocate of this approach. See, e.g., Why Democracy Makes
Economic Sense, THE NEW REPUBLIC, December 19, 1983 at 30 (review of Olson's book). For a
more extended discussion, see R. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER DECLINE AND
RISE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (1983).
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of the society, to the transcendant unities that bind us rather than to the
fragmented allegiances that divide us. This is an important technique
of political leadership in all seasons. In some circumstances, such as dur-
ing war, severe economic depression, or other occasions of widely-per-
ceived national peril, appeals for mutual sacrifices for the common good
may succeed for a time in suppressing the energetic assertion of special
interests. Under more normal conditions, however, such appeals almost
inevitably degenerate into the sloganeering rhetoric of WIN buttons and
bumper stickers. It is doubtful that any meaningful, enduring response
to the pervasive problem of special interest group politics can be con-
structed on such an episodic basis.
A fifth approach would be to redefine the problem of organizational
power by actively encouraging the emergence of more and different or-
ganizations, rather than seeking fewer of them. Public policy could seek
to intervene selectively in order to influence the pluralistic process itself.
In a kind of political version of genetic engineering, it could design, cre-
ate and nurture innovative, countervailing organizations that might
neutralize the power of existing distributional coalitions.
This approach has often been attempted during our recent history.
The community action programs of the Great Society era, for example,
were designed to precipitate precisely this kind of organizational
growth, bringing new, relatively unrepresented interests into the polit-
ical bargaining process. Other policies, such as the adoption of fee-shift-
ing rules62 and requirements of broad public participation in the
administrative process,63 may alter the incentives and structure of the
advocacy process, thereby producing much the same effects.
Organizational development policies of this kind cannot avoid the in-
evitable fostering of parochial self-interest in the newly-formed groups.
But such policies do have the advantage of transforming the necessity of
special interest group power into the virtue of a more balanced, encom-
passing pluralism. They also recognize a salient political fact that is
easily forgotten-that in the modern administrative state, the most pow-
erful and least controllable special interest groups may well be public
bureaucracies rather than labor unions or large corporations, and that
an enhanced advocacy process can be an important technique for bring-
ing those often self-serving public bureaucracies to heel.
The dangers of this approach, however, cannot be ignored. Political
elites may simply spawn new groups in order to co-opt them for their
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (proceedings in vindication of Civil Rights-attorney's fees).
63. Sunshine Act of 1976, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976); also The Federal Advisory Commit-
tee Act of 1976, 5 U.S.C. App. § I et. seq. (1972).
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own parochial purposes. 64 A self-conscious, governmentally-sponsored
policy of organizational development may create political constituencies
that all too quickly become artificial, self-interested and self-perpetuat-
ing. Perhaps most troubling, such a policy may simply elevate special
interest group politics to a higher level of organizational conflict and
political stalemate. This rarefied battlefield may be one on which, to
paraphrase Grant Gilmore, government can no longer effectively govern
but the punctilio of pluralism is meticulously observed.
65
Another strategy, of course, is to do nothing, simply maintaining the
status quo. There is much to be said for this approach. As I write, the
American economy continues to grow at a rapid rate, with relatively
stable prices, expanding employment, and rising productivity. Even
measured over a longer period, recent economic performance has been
remarkable, especially its ability during the last decade to generate new
jobs in the face of an enormous influx of new, often inexperienced work-
ers-most notably women, undocumented aliens and "baby boomers"
entering the job market. 66 At least compared to the other Western de-
mocracies, plagued by high energy costs, declining population, and
large state bureaucracies, our economic prospects appear to be excellent.
During this same period of economic growth, the process of political
group formation actually accelerated, as the much-bruited, much-mis-
understood phenomenon of "single issue" and "special interest" politics
suggests. Many Americans will regard both developments, on balance,
as benign, enlarging the transformative power and responsiveness of our
economic and political systems. For such people, the "if it ain't broke,
don't fix it" principle will seem applicable to this case.
Others, however, will not be convinced by this optimistic account of
contemporary American society. They will insist instead upon struc-
tural changes to prevent what they perceive as the steady sapping of
America's economic and political lifeblood. For them, more drastic in-
terventions will seem imperative, and the approaches that I sketched
earlier (or others) may be attractive. They will argue that a liberal soci-
ety like ours can self-consciously shape its organizations, and hence its
64. See e.g., P. SELZNICK, TVA AND THE GRASS ROOTS (1966).
65. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 110 (1977).
66. "Total employment grew by 24 percent in the United States during [the 1970's]. The
next best performer was Japan, with a 9 percent increase. Other countries were far behind; in
Germany, for example, employment actually fell. Moreover, the United States was one of
only three major industrial countries-Italy and Canada having been the others-with any
increase in manufactunhg employment." Schultze, Industrial Polic: A Dissent, THE BROOKINGS
REVIEW, Fall 1983, at 5. During that decade, per capita disposable income grew at an aver-
age of 2.2 percent a year above the inflation rate; this growth rate was less than in the 1960's
(3%) but well above the rate in the 1950's (1.2%). CLARK, DiggingA Grave, NATIONAL J. Oct.
29, 1983, at 2278.
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political destiny in many ways, even in the face of the current Supreme
Court's expansive understanding of the reach of the First Amendment. 67
They will say of the pluralistic status quo, as Justice Jackson said of the
Constitution, that it is not a suicide pact.
Fortunately, we have not yet reached the point at which such funda-
mental constitutional choices must once again be made. In my view, it
is highly doubtful that we ever shall. The Rise and Declhne of Nations, then
offers us a provocative analysis and a valuable warning. It does not,
however, foretell an ineluctable fate.
67. Supra notes 55-57.

